Reporting regimes diverge
FRONTIER, the AI Incident Reporting Act, the AI Flaw Reporting bill, the Secure AI Development Act, and the intelligence authorization use different triggers, clocks, recipients, and mandatory or voluntary structures.
An inventory of legislation involving frontier models, evaluations, incident reporting, CBRNE, cyber, and critical infrastructure.
The inventory is organized by the principal legislative mechanism, with secondary tags preserving cross-cutting functions such as CBRNE, incident reporting, preemption, and model security.
Search full text, filter by legislative type and committee, compare measures, and open any row for the policy substance and committee dynamics.
| Measure | Title | Type | Sponsor | Status | Committee | Outlook / result |
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A curated safety/security view. Highlighted states have at least one officially verified record; select a state to filter the inventory.
Tile map is schematic. Gray states have not yet entered the curated starter set.
| State | Tracked | Enacted | Core | Latest action |
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The bill count overstates policy coherence. The central challenge is reconciling overlapping and sometimes incompatible architectures across committees and vehicles.
FRONTIER, the AI Incident Reporting Act, the AI Flaw Reporting bill, the Secure AI Development Act, and the intelligence authorization use different triggers, clocks, recipients, and mandatory or voluntary structures.
Pending bills alternate between mandatory developer assurance, secure pre-release testing, federal evaluation capacity, federal-use testbeds, and voluntary documentation standards—with no clear reciprocity rule.
FRONTIER’s targeted model differs sharply from the failed broad state-law moratorium. Any new amendment should be checked line by line for coverage of developers, deployers, generally applicable law, civil rights, privacy, minors, and procurement.
Prevention, detection, incident reporting, investigation, sanctions, and export-control response are spread across separate bills and agencies rather than joined into one statutory pathway.
Congress is addressing synthesis screening, model evaluation, terrorism assessment, and military incidents, but no single measure connects capability findings to controlled access, screening, escalation, and response.
NIST, CAISI, CISA, NSA, Defense, and intelligence-community duties depend on appropriations. Authorization without people, compute, secure facilities, and evaluation funding may remain aspirational.
Official legislative sources provide the facts. The tracker adds clearly labeled analysis, cites the evidence behind each record, and keeps a public history of changes.
Download the current generated dataset, its full validation schema, or a spreadsheet-friendly CSV. All three are rebuilt from the same canonical records.